Statutorily, the county legislative body appoints the Veterans' Service Officer, sets the compensation of the Veterans' Service Officer and appropriates the funds for the county service office.

County Service Office

The county legislative body is authorized to establish a service office for the purpose of advising veterans of the United States armed forces, and their dependents, of all rights, privileges, immunities and benefits to which they may be entitled under any law, state or federal, and which may be made available to them by private institutions, organizations or individuals and of assisting them in every way possible in obtaining such rights, immunities and benefits. T.C.A. § 58-3-109.

The county legislative body is authorized to appropriate such funds as may be deemed necessary for the operation of the service office. T.C.A. § 58-3-110(a).

Veterans' Service Officer

The service office is staffed by an accredited Veterans' Service Officer. T.C.A. § 58-3-109.

The Veterans' Service Officer is chosen by the county legislative body of the county creating the service office by which the officer is to be employed. T.C.A. § 58-3-111(a). The statutes do not set a term of office for the Veterans' Service Officer.

Qualifications and Duties

The Veterans' Service Officers shall be an honorably discharged veteran of the United States armed forces. T.C.A. § 58-3-111(c).

It is the duty of the Veterans' Service Officer to advise veterans of the United States armed forces, and their dependents, of all rights, privileges, immunities and benefits to which they may be entitled under any law, state or federal, and which may be made available to them by private institutions, organizations or individuals and of assisting them in every way possible in obtaining such rights, immunities and benefits. T.C.A. § 58-3-109.

The Veterans' Service Officer may administer oaths and take acknowledgments related to any matter falling within the scope of authority of their office, including the presentation of claims and other functions incident to obtaining benefits for discharged veterans. T.C.A. § 58-3-111(c).

No veteran or dependent of a veteran shall be charged any fee for services rendered by a Veterans' Service Officer.

Training

The Veterans' Service Officer is required to successfully complete training and be issued accreditation by the Department of Veterans Services within one year from the date of appointment. Any Veterans' Service Officer who does not complete the required training and receive accreditation within one year of appointment shall be removed from office by the governing body of the county creating the veterans' service office by which the officer is employed. T.C.A. § 58-3-111(d).

Compensation

The Veterans' Service Officer may receive compensation commensurate to the compensation paid to heads of county government departments of comparable size in the county in which the officer is employed. Such compensation may be prorated to reflect the number of hours that the officer actually works during a specific pay period. T.C.A. § 58-3-110(b).

Staff personnel employed by the service office may receive compensation commensurate with the compensation paid to county government employees in comparable positions. T.C.A. § 58-3-110(b).

Removal From Office - Discharge

It is not clear from the statutes whether the Veterans’ Service Officer is a county officer or a county employee. However, the great weight of authority leans towards county employee. Statutorily, the Veterans' Service Officer does not have a term of office. Tennessee courts have [ ] observed that the term "public officer" generally requires a set salary for a defined term of office, definite emoluments and defined duties fixed by statute. Wise v. City of Knoxville, 194 Tenn. 90, 93-94, 250 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tenn. 1952) (emphasis added). Reed v. Hamblen County, 468 F.Supp. 2, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (There is no term of office for veterans' service officers of Tennessee specified therein.) citing Gillespie v. Rhea County, 191 Tenn. 487, 235 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tenn. 1950).

In State ex rel. Lawson v. Farmer, 189 Tenn. 276, 225 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1949) and Gillespie v. Rhea County, 191 Tenn. 487, 235 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. 1950), the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a county service officer is an employee by contract rather than a public officer and may be discharged as an employee. 

In AG OP 80-364 (July 15, 1980), the Attorney General opined that the position of County Services Officer for Veteran Affairs is not a public office. Citing State ex rel. Lawson v. Farmer, 189 Tenn. 276 (1949). In AG OP 84–024 (January 23, 1984) the Attorney General opined that he could not be certain of the answer to the question of whether the State Supreme Court would conclude that the Hawkins County Veterans Service Officer was a public officer rather than a contractual employee of the county. And the Attorney General opined, solely for the purpose of deciding whether a county commissioner can be appointed a service officer and serve in both capacities, that a Veterans' Service Officer is a county officer. AG OP 86-042 (February 24, 1986) (a county commissioner may not legally be appointed county service officer and serve in both capacities).

Despite the varying Attorney General opinions, it is clear pursuant to the Tennessee Supreme Court cases mentioned above, that the county legislative body has the authority to discharge the Veterans' Service Officer. Where a county commission has hired an employee pursuant to lawful authority, the county commission is alone authorized to terminate that employee. See Gillespie v. Rhea County, 191 Tenn. 487, 493, 235 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. 1950) (right to fire follows from the right to hire).

In Gillespie v. Rhea County, 191 Tenn. 487, 235 S.W.2d 4 (1950), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the county legislative body could not elect a service officer for period extending into the term of a successor county legislative body, and that the successor county legislative body could discharge the service officer so elected.

The Court noted that where the tenure of office is not prescribed by statute or constitution, the power to remove is an incident to the power to appoint, and the power to remove cannot be contracted away so as to bind the appointing authority to retain a minor officer or employee for a definite, fixed term.